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Unaccountable at the Founding:
The Originalist Case for Anonymous Juries
The "anonymous jury" is quickly emerging as a powerful tool to protect
jurors.' Consider United States v. Shryock2: The defendants were
"extraordinarily violent" mobsters, drug lords, and killers.' They had a long
history of "threatening, assaulting, killing, or attempting to kill potential
witnesses."4 To prevent jury tampering, the district court permanently sealed
"the names, addresses, and places of employment of [venirepersons] and their
spouses."' After hearing the evidence, the nameless jurors sent nine defendants
to prison for life. 6 The jurors then slipped back into obscurity- never revealing
their identities.
Nearly every state and federal jurisdiction that has considered the issue
allows at least some use of anonymous juries.7 Nevertheless, defendants
1. See Adam Liptak, Nameless Juries Are on the Rise in Crime Cases, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 2002,
at Al.
2. 342 F.3d 948 (9 th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 965 (2004).
3. See id. at 972, 975; see also id. at 959-71.
4. Id. at 972.
5. See id. at 970.
6. Id. at 960 (listing nine life sentences, in addition to two 384-month sentences).
7. Ten federal circuits and seven states have upheld the constitutionality of anonymous juries.
See id. at 970-71; United States v. Mansoori, 304 F.3 d 635, 649 (7 th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Talley, 164 F. 3d 989, 1ool (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 31
(ist Cir. 1998); United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam);
United States v. Krout, 66 F.3 d 1420, 1426 (5 th Cir. 1995); United States v. Darden, 7o F. 3d
1507, 1532 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ross, 33 F.3 d 1507, 1519 (lith Cir. 1994); United
States v. Vario, 943 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Scarfo, 85o F.2d l015, 1023
(3d Cir. 1988); People v. Goodwin, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 576, 581 (Ct. App. 1997); State v.
Brown, 118 P.3d 1273, 1279 (Kan. 2005); Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d 155, 171
(Mass. 1993); People v. Williams, 616 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); McKenzie v.
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continue to challenge the constitutionality of anonymous juries under the Sixth
Amendment. In response, courts use balancing tests to weigh defendants'
constitutional rights against jurors' security concerns.8
This Comment argues that the courts overlook important Founding-era
evidence on juror accountability. It concludes that the Public Trial Clause does
not require juror identification. Part I describes the Public Trial Clause
accountability argument made against the anonymous jury. Part II then turns
to the evidence rebutting this argument- namely, that the First Congress
treated juror identification requirements as statutory law, not constitutional
law, and that the accountability argument is inconsistent with the theory of
juries that prevailed at the Founding.
I. THE PUBLIC TRIAL CLAUSE AS AN ACCOUNTABILITY
REqUIREMENT
Criminal defendants strenuously resist the spread of anonymous juries.
The Shryock defendants, 9 for example, claimed that juror anonymity violated
their Public Trial Clause"0 rights. This argument, elaborated more fully in
other sources, is essentially that "public trials produce greater reliability
because the [jurors] are accountable" to the observing public." Conversely, the
"deindividuation" of anonymity strips jurors of personal responsibility and
dilutes their sense of duty. 2 The Public Trial Clause, they argue, checks
State, 583 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998); State v. Hill, 749 N.E.2d 274, 282 (Ohio 2001)
(holding only that anonymous juries do not constitute structural constitutional error); State
v. Tucker, 657 N.W.2d 374, 379 (Wis. 2003). Two states have denied motions for an
anonymous jury without reaching the constitutional questions. See State v. Accetturo, 619
A.2d 272, 275 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (finding no need for an anonymous jury);
People v. Watts, 661 N.Y.S.2d 768, 769 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (citing statutory law).
8. See, e.g., Mansoori, 304 F. 3d at 650-51 (balancing impartial jury rights against security).
9. Appellants' Joint Opening Brief at 88, Shryock, 342 F.3d 948 (No. 97-50468).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
ii. Death Eligible Defendants' Response to Motion To Empanel Anonymous Jury and Delay
Disclosure of Witness Names and Places of Abode at 9, United States v. Cisneros, No. 03-
0730 (D. Ariz. filed Apr. 18, 2005).
m,. Ephraim Margolin & Gerald F. Uelmen, The Anonymous Jury: Jury Tampering by Another
Name?, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1994, at 14, 61; see also Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and the
Perseverance of First Impressions, 46 Soc. PsycH. Q. 285, 286, 290-91 (1983) (indicating that
accountability expectations may affect a juror's level of care).
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misconduct by creating personal and reputational accountability for jury
verdicts. 3
Although not cited by the Shryock defendants, three historical facts support
their claim. First, venirepersons in the Founding era were local, drawn from
relatively intimate communities.14 Because these individuals were often known
(or at least identifiable) to onlookers, juror identification may have been an
assumed characteristic of early trials. Second, the First Continental Congress
expressly cited reputational accountability as a virtue of jury trials. In the Leiter
to the Inhabitants of Quebec, the Continental Congress stated that jurors "cannot
injure [a defendant], without injuring their own reputation[s]." is Third,
Thomas Jefferson famously supported local juror accountability. In fact, if
Jefferson had any reservation about reputational checks, it was because he
thought them too weak. 6 Jefferson repeatedly petitioned for more concrete
electoral checks on jurors. 7
Several jurists and commentators have accepted the Shryock defendants'
fundamental proposition, as a matter of both policy and history. As to the
former, Justice Harlan commented in a concurrence that "the public-trial
guarantee embodies a view of human nature, true as a general rule, that...
jurors will perform their respective functions more responsibly in an open
13. See Marvin Zalman & Maurisa Gates, Rethinking Venue in Light of the "Rodney King" Case: An
Interest Analysis, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 215, 238 (1993) ("'Understandably sensitive to
community reputation,'" a local juror in a small town "may indeed feel a sense of personal
responsibility... that a resident of an urban area... may not." (quoting Corona v. Superior
Court, loi Cal. Rptr. 411,418 (1972))).
14. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 88-93 (1998) (describing Founding-era
jurors as provincials, accustomed to local ways and manners).
15. CONT'L CONG., LETTER TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC (1774), reprinted
in 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1779, at 105, 107 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1904). The Letter also refers to jury trials as a "full enquiry, face to face,
in open Court, before as many of the people as chuse to attend." Id. But this language does
not fairly implicate juror identification. Rather, "face to face" was a term of art in the late
eighteenth century, referring to the requirement of face-to-face confrontation between
accusing witnesses and the defendant. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. art. XII; N.H. CONST. art. XV.
For a discussion of "open courts" and public trials, see infra notes 36-38 and accompanying
text.
16. See Enclosure in Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 26, 1798), in 2 THE
REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN JEFFERSON AND MADISON 1776-
1826, at 1076, 1077 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995).
17. See, e.g., id.; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor (Nov. 26, 1798), in 30 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 588, 589-90 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2003); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to John Tyler (May 26, 181o), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
391, 393 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905).
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court than in secret proceedings. ''18 On the historical front, Professor Daniel
Blinka has claimed that Founding-era jurors "risked damaging their own
reputations" when they reached unpopular verdicts. 9 Together, their writings
suggest that anonymous juries lack the reputational stakes essential to reliable
trials.
II. FOUNDING-ERA EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANONYMOUS JURIES
The argument that the Public Trial Clause forbids anonymous juries is
unpersuasive for three reasons. First, the First Congress rejected a
constitutional provision that would have prohibited at least some anonymous
juries. The earliest phrasing of the Sixth Amendment required criminal
prosecutions to adhere to all the "accustomed requisites" of jury trials'0 that
is, the jury trial customs long followed in England and the colonies. When this
phrase was proposed and rejected in 1789,21 juror identification was an
accustomed requisite of criminal trials at common law.' Further, English
statutory law had expressly guaranteed limited juror identification rights for
more than eighty years. 3 In this historical context, the accustomed requisites
clause, had it survived, likely would have protected juror identification rights.
But in rejecting the clause, the First Congress suggested that juror
identification is a nonconstitutional issue. As Justice White commented in a
similar Sixth Amendment dispute, the elimination of the accustomed requisites
clause
is concededly open to the explanation that "accustomed requisites"
were thought to be already included in the concept of a "jury." But that
explanation is no more plausible than the contrary one: that the
i8. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
ig. Daniel D. Blinka, "This Germ of Rottedness": Federal Trials in the New Republic, 1789-1807, 36
CREIGHTONL. REV. 135, 139 (2003).
z0. See i ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
21. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 393-95
(Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) (collecting drafts of the Sixth Amendment from the First
Congress).
22. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *352-53, *355; 4 id. at *344.
23. Treason Act of 17o8, 7 Ann., C. 21, S ii (Eng.) ("[W]hen any person is indicted for high
treason, or misprision of treason, a list.., of the jury, mentioning the names, profession,
and place of abode of the ... jurors, [shall] be . .. given ... to the party indicted."). See
generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 103 (2003)
(giving reasons why the Framers were likely to be aware of English treason laws).
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deletion had some substantive effect. Indeed,... the latter explanation
is, if anything, the more plausible .... [W]here Congress wanted to
leave no doubt that it was incorporating existing common-law features
of the jury system, it knew how to use express language to that effect.'
Although it rejected a constitutional requirement, the First Congress
adopted a statutory juror identification requirement. Borrowing phrases from
its familiar English antecedent," the First Crimes Act in 1790 guaranteed juror
identification rights to discrete classes of criminal defendants.26 That the First
Congress bestowed jury identification rights through statute when it had
refused to do so in the text of the Sixth Amendment provides strong evidence
that the Amendment was not intended to guarantee those rights.
Second, early American policymakers rejected overt means of securing juror
accountability, fearing a threat to juror autonomy. Jurors were a buffer on - not
the servant of-popular passions. Justice Story, echoing other esteemed
constitutional writers in the early Republic, summarized the operative theory:
The great object of a trial by jury in criminal cases is, to guard against a
spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers, and against a
spirit of violence and vindictiveness on the part of the people. Indeed, it
is often more important to guard against the latter, than the former.
2 7
This principled commitment to jury autonomy is evident throughout
Founding-era trial procedure. Take, for starters, the process of choosing a
venire: Random selection was the Founding-era norm."8 The political
24. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 97 (1970) (White, J.) (considering whether the
Constitution requires a twelve-person criminal jury); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI
(protecting expressly, not impliedly, the right to a local jury).
25. See Treason Act of 17o8, § ii.
26. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, S 29, 1 Stat. 112, 118 ("[Any person who shall be accused and
indicted of treason, shall have... a list of the jury... mentioning the names and places of
abode of such.., jurors, delivered unto him at least three entire days before he shall be tried
for the same; and in other capital offences, shall have such copy of the indictment and list of
the jury two entire days at least before the trial. . . ."). The current version of this statute,
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (2000), applies in all capital cases except those in which it "may
jeopardize the life or safety of any person."
27. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1774, at
653 (photo. reprint 1991) (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833); see, e.g., JOHN TAYLOR, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE GovERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 209
(photo. reprint 1998) (1814) ("[W]e expect the independence of juries" from "kings,
presidents, factions, and demagogues.... .").
28. See 2 ALExIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 17 n.* (Henry Reeve trans., London,
Saunders & Otley, 3d ed. 1838) (1835). Even so, some juror selection processes were more
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consequences of this method are significant, as random selection insulated
jurors from political pressures. Juries did not - at least formally - answer to the
public at large, and they had little incentive to engage in demagoguery. Even
after the empanelment process, jurors enjoyed marked independence. Juries
had the right to deliberate in secret, without meddling eyes.29 Juries decided
questions of both law and fact,3" controlling case outcomes with nearly
absolute finality. 1 Moreover, jurors could announce decisions without fear of
personal loss or liability, even if the judge had demanded a different verdict.32
The early Republic minimized outside influences and constraints on jury
deliberations and discretion.
Thus, in supporting juror accountability, Thomas Jefferson stood in sharp
contrast to his peers. He derided randomly selected venirepersons as
"accidental" juries,3 repeatedly proposing juror elections as a method for
increasing accountability. But Jefferson's ideas were "politically stillborn" ;' his
petitions invariably failed to find the support of an electoral majority. Even
close friends responded coolly, if politely, to Jefferson's recommendations."5 In
random than others. Compare Act of Dec. 13, 1756, in 18 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE
STATE OF GEORGIA 144, 145-47 (Allen D. Candler ed., 191o) (selecting jurors by blindly
drawing from a box containing the names of all qualified individuals), with Act of Oct, 11,
1744, in 9 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 45, 45-46 (Charles J.
Hoadly ed., Hartford, Case, Lockwood & Brainard Co. 1876) (appointing panels of
venirepersons annually, from which jurors were randomly selected).
29. See Shaftesbury's Trial, (1681) 8 Howell's State Trials 759, 772 (K.B.) (Eng.)
(acknowledging the jury's ancient right to secret deliberations). But see John H. Langbein,
The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 289-96 (1978) (describing
how, without lawyers in the courtroom, a jury's right to secret deliberations could be
jeopardized).
30. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794) (Jay, C.J.).
31. AHKJL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 235, 238 (2005) (describing
presumptive judicial deference to jury findings in the Founding era).
32. See Bushell's Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. ioo6 (K.B.) (establishing legal immunity for juror
decisions). This immunity represented a dramatic shift in favor of juror autonomy. 3
BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *4o3-o4; 4 id. at *354 (describing how, before the
abandonment of writs of attaint, jurors supporting "false" verdicts were imprisoned,
condemned to permanent infamy, and stripped of all property, while their homes were torn
down and their wives and children cast outdoors).
33. See Enclosure in Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 16, at 1076.
34. See Blinka, supra note 19, at 18o (describing the failure of Jefferson's 1798 petition).
35. See, e.g., Letter from John Taylor to Thomas Jefferson (n.d.), in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 17, at 6ol, 602 ("The idea of reforming our jury... was deserted on
account of the difficulties which presented themselves, and the opinion that congress would
disregard it.").
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consistendy declining Jeffersonian juror election schemes, early policymakers
indicated ongoing satisfaction with the relative lack of juror accountability.
Third, most of the Founding figures did not endorse even reputational
checks on jury discretion. Although it would have been logically consistent to
accept reputational accountability while rejecting more overt checks, this does
not appear to have been their method. At the Founding, there were
reputational accountability arguments, and there were arguments in favor of
local jurors -but these two ideas were separate and distinct. Today's criminal
defense bar anachronistically conflates these two arguments, asserting that
local jurors in the Founding era were seen as more reliable because they were
known and reputationally accountable for their actions.
To be sure, Founding-era literature 6 on the Public Trial Clause discusses
reputational accountability extensively. But the literature contemplates
reputational checks on judges and witnesses - not on jurors. Publius, William
Blackstone, and Matthew Hale, among others, agreed that public observation
incentivized judges to behave properly: "[I]f the judge be partial, his partiality
and injustice will be evident to all by-standers."37 Blackstone and Hale further
agreed that witnesses would be less apt to lie in public settings: "[A] witness
may frequently depose that in private, which he will [b]e ashamed to testify in
a public and solemn tribunal" in the "presence of all mankind.",8 But as for the
public reputations of jurors, the original Public Trial Clause literature is silent.
Meanwhile, the Founding-era literature supports local jurors, but for non-
reputational reasons. Local juries "were supposed to have .. a prior and a
perfect knowledge ... of the characters of the parties themselves, as of the
witnesses."39 Local juries were further known to have "private knowledge of
[the] facts," which they were to consider in addition to any evidence presented
at trial. 4 ' The jurors were valued for their familiarity with the locale -not for
the locale's familiarity with the jurors.
The "stranger jury" debate illustrates this distinction well. When submitted
to the states for ratification in 1787, the Constitution guaranteed only that a
36. Cf. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 11-22 (1997) (discussing the primary sources of the Founding era).
37. MATTHEw HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw OF ENGLAND 344 (London,
Butterworth, 6th ed. 1820); see also 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *372; THE FEDERALIST
No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The temptations to prostitution, which the judges might
have to surmount, must certainly be much fewer while the co-operation of a jury is
necessary ... ").
38. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *373; see also HALE, supra note 37, at 345.
39. HALE, supra note 37, at 338 n.B; see also 3 STORY, supra note 27, § 1775.
40. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *374.
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jury trial would be "held in the State where... the [alleged] Crimes shall have
been committed."4' Some delegates in various state ratification conventions
were concerned about the prospect of "jur[ies] of strangers" from far-off parts
of the state.42 These delegates focused on two criticisms: Stranger juries were
unfamiliar with the trustworthiness of the defendant and the witnesses, and
stranger juries were unacquainted with the facts of the crime.43 (Other
delegates actively supported stranger juries because of their impartiality' -a
perspective that appears to have won out over time.)
This stranger jury debate is significant not so much for what the
participants said, but for what they failed to say. None of the delegates
suggested that local jurors were more reliable or conscientious because they
were reputationally accountable in the community. Instead, the delegates made
the traditional arguments found in the contemporaneous literature; they
discussed knowledgeable jurors, but not a community knowledgeable about an
individual's behavior inside the jury box. If reputational accountability for
jurors had been a commonly accepted principle at the Founding, one would
expect at least one delegate to have articulated an argument on its behalf. But
nobody did.
The most plausible explanation is that support for reputational checks on
jurors was anomalous and unorthodox. Although the First Continental
41. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
42. See 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 109-10, 400, 517 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES];
3 id. at 447, 547, 578-79; 4 id. at 295; see, e.g., Letter from Agrippa, MAss. GAZETrE, Dec. ii,
1787, reprinted in 4 THE CoMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 77, 78-79 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
These concerns were not unfounded. See Blinka, supra note 19, at 169-70 (describing how a
majority of jurors in some early federal trials were summoned from relatively distant
places).
43. See 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 42, at 547 (recording Edmund Pendleton's observation at
the Virginia ratification convention that the latter was more faithful to the traditional
vicinage rationale). Thomas Tredwell of New York noted a third problem with stranger
juries that, although not supporting an objection to juror anonymity under the Public Trial
Clause, might support an objection under the Impartial Jury Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. Tredwell claimed defendants could not use their preemptory challenges
effectively because strangers' biases would be unknown. 2 id. at 400. If the criminal defense
bar uses Tredwell's statements to advance an argument under the Impartial Jury Clause, it
will likely face two counterarguments. First, several Founding figures believed stranger
venires would yield more impartial juries, not fewer impartial juries. See infra note 44 and
accompanying text. Second, Tredwell could not foresee modem juror questionnaires and
voir dire procedures, which help ensure Impartial Jury Clause compliance.
44. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 42, at 112-13; 4 id. at 15o; see also Letter from the
Federal Farmer, Oct. 12, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 42,
at 245, 249.
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Congress's Letter expressly cites jurors' reputational incentives, the Letter
appears to be the only reference to jurors' reputational accountability within a
voluminous early literature on juries. Its singularity stands in telling contrast to
the contemporaneous literature's chorus on judicial and witness accountability.
CONCLUSION
Anonymous juries are a powerful but controversial prophylactic against
jury tampering. As seen in Shryock, criminal defendants emphatically resist
juror anonymity. They claim, in part, that the Public Trial Clause requires
reputational accountability for jurors.
But to the historian, a different reading of that Clause seems more
defensible. After empanelling twelve unbiased citizens - a microcosm of We the
People4 - most Founding figures felt little need to hold juries accountable.
46
Juries were not an institution in need of oversight or direction. Disinterested
jurors were themselves the checking mechanism, serving as both a buffer to
public passions and a populist restraint on judicial tyranny.
Founding-era juries were, in a word, trusted. The Public Trial Clause




45. See TAYLOR, supra note 27, at 208-11 (conceptualizing the jury as Article III's populist lower
house, counterbalancing aristocratic professional judges in the upper house).
46. Or in the memorable words of an Anti-Federalist describing the trustworthiness of juries:
"[An] impartial [juror] . . . would . .. as soon do you right as wrong .... " Essay by a
Farmer, MD. GAZETTE, Mar. 21, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 42, at 36, 39.
47. Osborn Maledon, a Phoenix law firm, generously and graciously sponsored the bulk of my
historical research. For their support, I am grateful.
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